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Non-technical Summary
A growing literature studies the role of political institutions in shaping fiscal outcomes.
One of the most important differences in political institutions of established democracies
is whether fiscal and economic decisions are made by elected representatives or through
direct voting. Popular influence over policy making brings fiscal policy closer to the
electorate’s preferences. If representatives prefer more spending than voters, then direct
democracy will constrain public budgets. If voters prefer more spending than represen-
tatives, then spending will be higher in political jurisdictions that allow for more direct
democracy.
The public choice tradition argues that elected politicians tend to overspend, overtax
and to overborrow due to the interests and influence of bureaucrats or special interest
groups. Direct democracy may shift power to voters themselves thus alleviating the
principle-agent problems. Direct legislation is one mechanism of the fiscal constitution
that allows voters to constrain the Leviathan government.
In a federal setting, however, local voters may face particular common-pool disincen-
tives. If the funding of municipalities originates from a “common pool” of country-wide
and future taxpayers, voters also welcome overspending on local public goods and ser-
vices. Voter disincentives may even be larger than those of local politicians. The latter
are often constrained by the policies of their countrywide parties. This may result in
voters’ inaction against constraining the Leviathan or even incentivize them to act as a
Leviathan themselves against the taxpayers of other jurisdictions. In this case, direct
democracy increases spending.
The present paper tries to answer empirically which of the two perspectives has va-
lidity for Germany. It is the first analysis of the link between direct democracy and fiscal
outcomes for Germany, an archetypal cooperative federation. Hence, Germany offers an
intriguing case of comparison against the existing Swiss and US evidence.
The starting point of the empirical analysis exploits the variance in the use of voter
initiatives at the municipal level in the German State of Bavaria. We have information
on all initiatives since the introduction of the right of petitioning for referenda in 1995.
Using an selection on observables approach, we find a negative instantaneous correlation
between referenda activity and municipal budgets. This turns positive with increasing
lags.
To address the obvious endogeneity problems of the selection on observables approach,
the main part of the analysis exploits the discontinuous relationship between municipal
population sizes on the one hand and signatures needed to initiate referenda as well as the
minimum quorum requirements for referenda to be approved on the other. A regression-
discontinuity design can be used to identify the causal effect of direct democracy. To
safeguard against other exogenous co-treatments that might affect fiscal institutions si-
multaneously at the same thresholds, we also implement a “difference-in-discontinuity
design” by comparing the discontinuities in the pre- and post-reform periods.
The results indicate that in the German federal setting, direct democracy had a sig-
nificantly positive and robust effect on local government spending and revenue. We
estimate the size of effect to be a 10% average increase in annual per capita municipal
spending and revenue. A plausible explanation for this result diverging from the Swiss
or US experience is that the cooperative form of federalism in Germany results in strong
common-pool disincentives on part of local voters.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Eine wachsende Literatur befasst sich mit dem Einfluss von politischen Institutionen auf
fiskalische Ergebnisse. Einer der wichtigsten Unterschiede zwischen den politischen Insti-
tutionen etablierter Demokratien betrifft das Ausmaß der direkten Demokratie. Der un-
mittelbare Wa¨hlereinfluss sollte eine Anna¨herung der Fiskalpolitik an die Wa¨hlerpra¨feren-
zen erzwingen. Wenn politische Repra¨sentanten ein ho¨heres Ausgabeniveau als Wa¨hler
bevorzugen, dann sollte direkte Demokratie folglich die Ho¨he der o¨ffentlichen Haushalte
begrenzen. Wenn Wa¨hler ein ho¨heres Ausgabeniveau bevorzugen, dann sollten umgekehrt
mit direkter Demokratie gro¨ßere Budgets einhergehen.
Die Public-Choice-Tradition argumentiert, dass gewa¨hlte Politiker u¨berma¨ßige Aus-
gaben, Steuern und Schulden pra¨ferieren, weil sie von Bu¨rokratie und von Interessengrup-
pen beeinflusst werden. Direkte Demokratie verlagert dann die Macht zu den Wa¨hlern
selber, was Prinzipal-Agenten-Probleme abmildert. Direkte Gesetzgebung wa¨re somit ein
Mechanismus in einer Fiskalverfassung, der den Wa¨hlern hilft, den Leviathan zu begren-
zen.
In einem fo¨deralen Umfeld sind Wa¨hler aber mo¨glicherweise besonderen Common-
Pool-Fehlanreizen ausgesetzt. Wenn die Finanzierung von Kommunen aus einem gemein-
samen Topf (dem “Common Pool”) landesweiter und zuku¨nftiger Steuereinnahmen herr-
u¨hrt, dann werden auch Wa¨hler ein u¨berma¨ßiges Ausgabenniveau zur Bereitstellung
lokaler o¨ffentlicher Gu¨ter und Dienstleistungen bevorzugen. Diese Fehlanreize ko¨nnen
auf der Ebene der Wa¨hler sogar gro¨ßer als auf der Ebene der lokalen Politiker sein.
Letztere sind oft durch die Politiken landesweiter Parteien restringiert. Das kann dazu
fu¨hren, dass Wa¨hler kein Interesse an der Begrenzung des Leviathan haben oder sogar
selber als Leviathan zu Lasten der Steuerzahler anderer Jurisdiktionen auftreten. Dann
wu¨rde direkte Demokratie ausgabesteigernd wirken.
Dieses Papier versucht fu¨r Deutschland empirisch zu beantworten, welche dieser bei-
den Sichtweisen stichhaltig ist. Es ist der erste Beitrag zum Einfluss von direkter Demokra-
tie auf fiskalische Ergebnisse fu¨r Deutschland, einem typischen Modellfall des koopera-
tiven Fo¨deralismus. Deutschland bietet somit einen interessanten Vergleichsfall zu den
Erfahrungen der Schweiz und USA.
Der Ausgangspunkt der empirischen Analyse macht sich die Varianz in der Nutzung
von Bu¨rgerbegehren in den Kommunen Bayerns zunutze. Wir verfu¨gen u¨ber Informa-
tionen u¨ber alle Bu¨rgerbegehren seit der Einfu¨hrung dieses Rechts auf der kommunalen
Ebene in Bayern im Jahr 1995. Der Einsatz eines konventionellen Regressionsansatzes
(“selection on observables”) erbringt eine negative zeitgleiche Korrelation zwischen dem
Auftreten von Bu¨rgerbegehren/Bu¨rgerentscheiden und der Ho¨he der kommunalen Aus-
gaben. Diese Korrelation wird mit steigendem zeitlichen Abstand positiv.
Um die offensichtlichen Endogenita¨tsprobleme dieses konventionellen Ansatzes zu
beru¨cksichtigen, nutzt der Hauptteil der Analyse die diskontinuierliche Beziehung zwis-
chen Bevo¨lkerungsgro¨ße und den Unterschrifts- und Beteiligungsquoren bei Bu¨rgerbegeh-
ren und Bu¨rgerentscheiden aus. Hier kann ein Regression-Discontinuity-Design zur An-
wendung kommen, um den kausalen Effekt der direkten Demokratie zu identifizieren. Um
dem Problem gleichzeitiger Beeinflussung der Fiskalpolitik durch andere institutionelle
A¨nderungen an der gleichen Sprungstelle zu begegnen, implementieren wir außerdem
ein “difference-in-discontinuity design”. Dabei wird die Diskontinuita¨t vor und nach der
Reform verglichen.
Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass unter den Bedingungen des deutschen Fo¨der-
alismus direkte Demokratie einen signifikant positiven und robusten Effekt auf die Aus-
gaben und Steuern der Kommunen ausu¨bt. Die Gro¨ße des Effekts bela¨uft sich auf einen
Anstieg von durchschnittlich 10% der Pro-Kopf-Ausgaben. Eine plausible Erkla¨rung fu¨r
diese stark von den Erfahrungen der Schweiz und USA abweichenden Ergebnisse ist, dass
der deutsche kooperative Fo¨deralismus zu starken Common-Pool-Fehlanreizen bei den
lokalen Wa¨hlern fu¨hrt.
Direct Democracy and Local Public Finances
under Cooperative Federalism
Zareh Asatryan (ZEW Mannheim and University of Freiburg) ∗
Thushyanthan Baskaran (University of Go¨ttingen)
Theocharis Grigoriadis (Free University of Berlin)
Friedrich Heinemann (ZEW Mannheim and University of Heidelberg)
June, 2013
Abstract
This paper exploits the introduction of the right of referenda at the local level in
the German state of Bavaria in 1995 to study the fiscal effects of direct democracy.
In the first part of the paper, we establish the relationship between referenda ac-
tivity and fiscal performance by using a new dataset containing information on all
2500 voter initiatives between 1995 to 2011. This selection on observables approach,
however, suffers from obvious endogeneity problems in this application. The main
part of the paper exploits population dependent discontinuities in the signature and
quorum requirements of referenda to implement a regression discontinuity design
(RDD). To safeguard against co-treatments that might affect fiscal outcomes simul-
taneously at the same thresholds, we validate our results by extending the RDD
approach to a difference-in-discontinuity (DiD) design. By studying direct legisla-
tion in an archetypical cooperative federation as Germany, our paper extends the
literature to a novel institutional setting. The results indicate that in our setting
– and in contrast to most of the evidence from Switzerland and the US – direct
democracy causes an expansion of local government budgets.
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1 Introduction
Chronic fiscal imbalances and acute debt crises in the industrialized world have intensified
the search for appropriate budgetary institutions. The underlying problem of budgetary
decision making in representative democracies has been diagnosed in the seminal work of
Shepsle, Weingast and Johnsen in the early 1980s (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981; Weingast
et al., 1981): Elected politicians tend to favor their regional or political constituencies in
spending decisions while the funding comes from the “common pool” of present and future
taxpayers. This asymmetry creates incentives to overspend, overtax and overborrow.
While the public finance literature is characterized by a large consensus on this diagnosis,
there is less of an agreement on the appropriate therapy. Several institutional treatments
have attracted attention ranging from adjustments in budgetary procedures (von Hagen,
2002; Hallerberg et al., 2007) to countervailing spending externalities through numerical
fiscal rules (Debrun et al., 2008).
A more direct way of addressing the disincentives of representative politicians is direct
democracy. Referenda reduce the decision making competencies of elected politicians
and shift power to the voters themselves, thereby alleviating possible principle-agent-
problems. If representative politicians (in a possible alliance with bureaucrats) disregard
the interests of taxpayers in general, the latter may use direct votes to discipline parlia-
ments.
Yet, it cannot be taken for granted that direct democracy will effectively constrain
overspending (see literature survey in the following section): Voters face similar common-
pool-disincentives as their representatives. Possibly, these disincentives are even larger
for local voters than for local politicians. This may hold, for example, if local politicians
have a less parochial perspective as a consequence of their membership in a country-wide
party. Further disincentives emanate from the incentives of the median voter. With
respect to redistributive spending projects it is well known that these are attractive for
the median voter if mean income exceeds median income (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
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From a theoretical standpoint, therefore, there are countervailing arguments on the
impact of direct democracy on the size of government. The outcome should also depend
on the characteristics of a fiscal constitution and its interaction with direct democracy:
Direct voter control has clearly less potential of curbing pork-barrel spending if a juris-
diction heavily relies on vertical or horizontal grants for financing its expenditure. When
there is no revenue autonomy at the local level, voters do not decide on their own tax
burden and will not be immune against common-pool-disincentives in direct votes.
Therefore, it is desirable to test for the impact of direct democracy in different federal
environments. However, the literature on the fiscal impact of direct democracy (surveyed
below) is largely limited to Switzerland and the US. The question is whether insights
from these countries are informative about the implications of direct democracy under
different institutional and cultural conditions. This is where our contribution lies. Our
paper is the first to look into the impact of direct democracy in Germany, an archetypical
cooperative federation.
We analyze the municipal experience in the federal state of Bavaria, where direct
democracy was introduced through a constitutional change in 1995 and where between
1995 and 2011 around 2500 petitions to implement referenda were recorded.1 The case of
the German municipalities is an important extension to the literature on direct democracy
and fiscal policy. In contrast to Switzerland and the US, direct democracy is a relatively
recent institutional innovation for German municipalities. German voters and politicians
lack long-run experience with this set of institutions. Furthermore, German federalism
is characterized by intensive equalization and joint taxation of all federal layers. To a
large extent, municipal revenues depend on fixed shares from country-wide general taxes
and on grants from their state. Hence, this federal system entails particular substantive
common-pool-disincentives. Germany offers a compelling testing ground to explore the
1The reason to concentrate on the case of Bavaria is that compared to other German La¨nder, local-
level direct democratic institutions in Bavaria, although being a relatively recent innovation, are by far
the strongest. This is clearly seen in Figure 1, where the total number of initiatives per Land are shown
along with the date of the adoption of the local-level direct democratic legislation.
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external validity of the numerous studies for the US and Switzerland: does the usual result
that direct democracy constrains spending survive in a different federal environment?
Our paper does not only contribute to the literature through its extension toward
another distinct federal context. In addition, it offers a credible identification strategy.
Here, we follow a recent innovative trend in the empirical public finance literature to
exploit population-discontinuities in federal constitutions for identification. Examples
along that avenue concern the impact of municipal council size on government spending
(Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012; Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger, 2010), the impact of politicians’
salaries on performance (Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013) or tests of the flypaper effect
(Dahlberg et al., 2008; Baskaran, 2012). Our contribution is not only the first to apply
a regression-discontinuity design (RDD) to study the impact of direct democracy. It
also makes use of a RDD-refinement which copes with the criticism from Ade and Freier
(2011). These authors point to the problem that, typically, certain population thresholds
have simultaneous functions in municipal constitutions. Identical population thresholds
affect council size, mayor salary, community status, grants or direct democracy provisions
at the same time. Furthermore, municipal population size is not perfectly immune to
some manipulation and, hence, not fully exogenous. These two problems may limit a
(one-dimensional) causal interpretation of a RDD approach. We deal with this problem
by applying a difference-in-discontinuity (DiD) design which exploits the introduction of
direct democracy and allows studying the impact of population discontinuities before and
after this innovation. Under certain conditions, this RDD-refinement allows filtering out
the causal impact of the direct democracy related thresholds.
We first start by studying the relationship between direct democracy in action - that is
the actual use of popular referenda in practice - and fiscal outcomes using a novel dataset
on 2099 Bavarian municipalities over the period from 1978 to 2011 and employing a
standard selection on observables methodology. This methodology, however, might suffer
from endogeneity and, therefore, rightly deserves criticism as a naive regression (Angrist
and Pischke, 2010). Therefore, we exploit in the second step a natural experiment based
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on population thresholds. In contrast to the Swiss or US cases, where the literature has
exploited constitutional differences in the direct democratic institutions across cantons
or states, we rely on the discontinuous relationship between municipal population size on
the one hand and signatures needed to initiate referenda, as well as the minimum quorum
requirements for referenda to be approved. We are able to complement the standard RDD
by a DiD design through comparing the impact of the discontinuity before and after the
introduction of municipal direct democracy in Bavaria in 1995.
The naive regression reveals an instantaneous negative correlation between referenda
activity and spending. However, this correlation turns positive with an increasing time
lag. These first insights from the selection on observables approach point to the possibility
that low spending may provoke voter resistance through initiatives which, after they
become effective, increase spending. The application of our causal identification strategy
establishes a positive impact of referenda on expenditures and revenues: There are jumps
in these variables’ levels at the relevant population thresholds. In addition, these jumps
are only detectable after the 1995 introduction of municipal direct democracy. Hence, we
can be confident that the jumps are not strongly driven by other municipal parameters
affected by the population thresholds. Robustness checks confirm the findings.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we summarize the literature
on direct democracy and fiscal outcomes, followed by a brief summary of the German
institutional setting and the Bavarian institutions of direct democracy. Subsequently, we
develop our identification strategy and present our empirical results.
2 Literature review
Views on how democracy affects fiscal policy have changed over time. When the first
modern democracies emerged in the late 19th century, political philosophers believed that
popular influence over policy making would cause a substantial rise in redistributive public
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spending.2 As the income distribution is right-skewed in most countries, the majority of
the electorate presumably prefers large redistributive transfers. In a democratic system,
therefore, public spending and thus taxation should be relatively high. Indeed, this view
on how democracy will affect fiscal policy is supported by theoretical contributions that
employ the median voter model (Kenny, 1978; Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
As a commitment against expropriatory taxation and, more generally, to account for the
drawbacks of democracy, many countries complement popular sovereignty with various
checks and balances. One of those checks is a representative form of government. The
logic is that through delegation of decision-making power to elected representatives, some
unintended negative side-effects of democracy may be avoided. Elected representatives,
it is often argued, are more educated, better informed and balanced than the average
voter. Therefore, the policies they choose will reflect these characteristics.
However, the alleged superiority of representative democracy in preventing expropri-
atory taxation has recently been questioned by scholars of political economics. The
continuous increase in the size of government since the early 20th century onward led re-
searchers to claim that representative democracies face an inherent spending bias. Baumol
and Bowen (1966), for example, argue that productivity growth is persistently smaller
than the growth of wages in the public sector. One reason for this phenomenon could
lie in the inability of politicians to deny public sector employees high wages. Niskanen
(1971) focuses on the bureaucracy in representative democracies. He argues that bureau-
crats prefer to have large budgets, because they are associated with more prestige and
facilitate higher salaries. Politicians in representative democracies, on the other hand,
have too few incentives to deny the bureaucracy the funds it requests. A third set of
authors states that public spending will be higher in representative forms of government
because of common pool problems. Weingast et al. (1981), in particular, argue that rep-
2Consider for example the famous quote that is often attributed to the 19th century philosopher and
lawyer Alexander Fraser Tytler (according to Niskanen et al. (1980)): “A democracy cannot exist as a
permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves
largesse from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates
promising the most benefits from the public treasury, with the result that a democracy always collapses
over loose fiscal policy, always followed by a dictatorship.”
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resentatives have an incentive to vote for higher spending if spending can be targeted to
their own constituency while the associated tax hikes affect all constituencies alike.3
The line of thinking about representative democracies culminated in theories – devel-
oped chiefly by public choice scholars – that perceive the state as a Leviathan. Rather
than discussing if and under what conditions representative government will result in
higher spending, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) simply assume that this type of govern-
ment has an inherent spending bias. In their view, representative democracies are only
interested in revenues and public spending. They will choose the highest possible level
of taxation, and only desist if stipulations in the fiscal constitution force them to do so.
Elections, on the other hand, are in their opinion an ineffective means to control the
growth of government.
Given the decisive role of the fiscal constitution identified by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980), researchers explored which constitutional features are particularly effective in
reigning in the spending bias of representatives. Constitutional features that have been
studied are, for example, budget institutions (tax, spending, and borrowing limits) In-
man (1998), electoral rules and regime types (Persson and Tabellini, 2004), and fiscal
decentralization (Schaltegger and Feld, 2009).
Direct democracy is another feature of the fiscal constitution, whose effect on fiscal
policy has been analyzed recently. However, the predictions about the effects of direct
democracy on fiscal policy are different in the political economics literature than in those
contributions that emphasize the dangers of democracy as such. In the political economics
literature, it is argued that direct democracy will limit rather than expand the size of
government. While the relevant authors do not dispute that that redistributive spending
might be higher in political jurisdictions that have direct democratic institutions, they
argue that this effect will be outweighed by the reduction in spending because of voters’
improved ability to control the Leviathan (Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001).
3A comprehensive discussion on various sources of inefficiency in representative democracies is offered
by Besley and Coate (1998).
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Given the countervailing effects, it is an empirical question as to whether direct democ-
racy leads to an expansion or a reduction in the size of government. A growing array
of empirical studies have analyzed this question. Most studies rely on cross-sectional
variation at the state and/or municipal level in two federations: the United States and
Switzerland. For the United States, the results are inconclusive. Some studies find that
direct democracy leads to smaller governments (Bails and Tieslau, 2000; Besley and Case,
2003; Blomberg et al., 2004), others find ambiguous results (Farnham, 1990; Matsusaka,
1995; Camobreco, 1998; Matsusaka, 2000; Salvino et al., 2012), and some suggest a posi-
tive effect of direct democratic legislation (Zax, 1989; Marschall and Ruhil, 2005; Primo,
2010). A further source of ambiguity is that municipal spending appears to be higher in
states with stricter direct democracy, suggesting a correlation between direct democracy
and the decentralization of spending (Matsusaka, 1995, 2000).
The studies for Switzerland point toward a negative effect of direct democracy on
government size (Pommerehne, 1978; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001; Feld and Matsusaka,
2003; Funk and Gathman, 2011). As in some of the findings for the US, however, Feld
et al. (2008) find that direct democracy induces less centralization, while Galletta and
Jametti (2012) argue that the vertical structure of direct democratic institutions also
matters and find higher local spending levels in municipalities without fiscal referenda
belonging to cantons with fiscal referenda compared to municipalities without direct
voting at any of the local or cantonal levels.
Most of these studies do not compare political jurisdictions with representative ver-
sus direct democratic legislations. In Switzerland, for example, all cantons have a voter
initiative and most have, in addition, a mandatory or an optional referendum. It is there-
fore not feasible to compare cantons with and without any direct democratic institutions.
Feld and Matsusaka (2003) and most other authors circumvent this problem by inter-
preting lower spending thresholds and smaller number of required signatures as evidence
of stronger direct democratic institutions, and, thus, compare political jurisdictions that
differ in the ease with which direct democratic elements can be initiated.
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Except for the US and Switzerland, only few countries have been studied by the lit-
erature on direct democracy. In fact, the only exception we are aware of is the study
by Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) that compares Swedish municipalities that
had direct democratic institutions with those that had a purely representative form of
government in the early 20th century. They find that local direct democracy leads to less
redistributive spending than representative forms of government. Their interpretation
of this finding differs from that of those authors that subscribe to the Leviathan view
of government, however. Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) explain their finding
by arguing that elites can capture the political process more easily in direct democratic
settings, which in turn causes spending that benefits the poor to decline.
Systematic evidence regarding the relationship between direct democracy and fiscal
policy from Germany is non-existent. 4 The reason is presumably that despite widespread
demand for more direct democracy from citizens (Feld et al., 2011), such institutions have
only recently been introduced in a comprehensive manner at the local level. By focusing
on the important state of Bavaria, our paper is hence the first that provides quantitative
evidence about the effects of direct democracy on fiscal policy in Germany.
3 Institutional details
The roots of direct democracy in Bavaria are in Germany’s constitutional revolution in
1918-19 and the emergence of the Weimar Republic (Setala and Schiller, 2012). Due to the
failure of the Weimar Republic and the experiences of the Nazi era, the federal and state
constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany had initially been restrictive on direct
4One exception is a recent study by Blume et al. (2011) that compares Bavarian pre- and post-
1995 local government expenditures with that of the neighboring Land of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg where
initiatives are allowed since 1956. The analysis, however, remains descriptive in nature due to small
number of observations as the local level fiscal data is aggregated to state level. Also, admittedly, the
heterogeneity of direct democratic institutions of the two states make them hard to compare. One proof
of heterogeneity, for example, is the fact that by 2011 three times more initiatives have happened in
Bavaria compared to Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, where the direct democratic legislation was adopted 40 years
earlier (Figure 1). Some of the reasons include intensive restrictions on topics of referenda (more correctly,
referenda can be initiated only in certain areas that are listed in in the law in a positive catalogue of
allowed topics), more conservative formal requirements of the initiative process etc.
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democratic institutions (Eder et al., 2009). Whereas the Basic Law (“Grundgesetz”) at
the federal level was almost purely representative, the constitutions in seven out of ten
Western German states allowed for some elements of direct democracy. The year 1989
and the peaceful collapse of Communism in Eastern Germany mark a turning point:
Since German reunification all new states established constitutions with direct democratic
elements and the old states adjusted their order. Even though today German voters in
all 16 states have the basic right to petition for popular initiatives at the state level,
initiating referenda remains very hard. Empirically, direct democracy was hardly used
before 1989 in the German states under more restrictive rules: only 27 initiatives had
been submitted, out of which only two made it to the popular vote. Both were rejected.
Interestingly, already in this early stage, Bavaria was a front-runner with almost half
of the state total number of initiatives (Eder et al., 2009). In the 1990s, the demand
for direct democracy increased in all states and, particularly, in Bavaria (Setala and
Schiller, 2012); the dominance of the Christian Social Union (CSU) has been identified
as one particular motivation for this movement since representative parliaments at state
and municipal levels used to be characterized by strong majorities of the CSU. Figure 1
shows the years of adopting local-level direct democratic legislation across German states
and the number of total initiatives since adoption.
Until 1995, the use of referenda in Bavaria was limited to the state level, yet with sig-
nificant barriers for the initiative process. Among other requirements, at the final stage
signatures amounting to the 10% of eligible voters (or around 900,000 signatures) had to
be collected in just two weeks time making the signature threshold virtually unachievable
(Verhulst and Nijeboer, 2008). In fact, only three state-wide referenda have been held in
Bavaria since the Second World War. In 1995, however, popular mobilization occurred
due to the efforts of “Mehr Demokratie” (“More Democracy”), a non-governmental asso-
ciation, which started to advertise the significance of direct democracy at the local level
already before reunification with increasing efforts in the early 1990s (Premat, 2006).
The pro-direct democracy alliance became attractive for opposition parties, social orga-
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nizations and even some CSU politicians that opposed to their party’s official policy line.
The initiative received strong support by nearly 1.2 million Bavarians in two weeks time
comfortably passing the 10% signature threshold, and was implemented as a referendum
in October, 1995 collecting 57.8% “yes-votes” (Verhulst and Nijeboer, 2008).
As a result, Article 18a was added to the Municipalities Law of the Free State of
Bavaria (Gemeindeordnung fu¨r den Freistaat Bayern) which defines the direct democratic
legislation at the municipal level: Voters can launch an initiative (“Bu¨rgerbegehren”) for
a referendum (“Bu¨rgerentscheid”) with respect to an issue within the competencies of
the municipality. Initiatives are not allowed to question the internal organization of the
municipal administration, competencies exclusively granted to the mayor by law, the legal
affairs of municipal council members, the mayor and municipal employees, and the budget
bylaws. An initiative successfully leads to a referendum if it is supported by a sufficient
number of signatures from municipal residents. These signature requirements depend on
the population size of the municipality, and there is no time limit for collection. Within
a month after submitting the application for a referendum, the municipal council has
to decide whether the conditions for a lawful referendum are fulfilled. In this case, the
referendum has to be conducted no later than three months after the council decision and
is implemented under the will of the simple majority. It is important to point out here
that an approved referendum has the legal effects of a municipal council decision; it can
be reversed only with another referendum on the same question within a year from the
first referendum. Thus, the introduction of direct democracy in Bavarian municipalities
in 1995 enabled citizens to conditionally substitute the legislative functions of elected
municipal council members.
Subsequent to its establishment, local direct democracy flourished in Bavaria and par-
ticularly in the first years, when between 1995 and 1999 close to 900 initiatives had taken
place (Figure 2 shows the total number of initiatives per Bavarian town, while the annual
evolution of initiatives and referenda are shown in Figure 3). This activity was signifi-
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cantly dampened after quorum requirements were introduced to the law in 1999.5 The
observation that higher signature or quorum requirements reduce the intensity of direct
democratic control is crucial for our identification strategy developed below. It is in
line with a general observation for Germany: Higher institutional requirements strongly
reduce the number of popular initiatives over all German states (Eder et al., 2009). Nev-
ertheless, in most years since then more than one hundred municipal initiatives take place
every year. Overall, in the post-reform period, between 1995 and 2011, there have been
around 2500 initiatives in all Bavarian municipalities roughly half of them reaching to
the polls.
As in all German States, municipalities in Bavaria are responsible for the provision of
important public goods to citizens such as kindergartens, elementary schools, utility and
infrastructure facilities, local streets, athletic areas and basic health care.
On the revenue side, Bavarian - like all German - municipalities enjoy some limited
degree of tax autonomy: They are able to set the tax rates of property taxes on land
and real estate and of a trade tax on local business. For these taxes, the tax bases are
uniformly defined nationwide but municipalities are free to decide the tax rate through
the definition of a tax multiplier. Nevertheless, municipal finance strongly depends on
country- and state-wide revenue sharing and equalization arrangements. Municipalities
receive predefined shares of VAT and income taxes without any autonomy to set e.g.
surcharges on these country-wide taxes. In addition, Bavarian municipalities depend
heavily on both block and special purpose grants received mainly from the state of Bavaria
(and to a smaller extent from the federal level). Thus, autonomously set municipal
taxes only amount to one quarter of total municipal revenues (Table 1). Grants received
from the state or federal level and shared taxes together make up more than half of the
5Initially, this quorum requirement did not exist. The participation rate in referenda was consistently
lower than municipal elections (Scarrow, 1999). This observation may explain why the Constitutional
Court of Bavaria ruled the lacking quorum requirement as unconstitutional so that the Bavarian state
parliament had to adjust the Municipalities Law accordingly. The new quorum requirement took effect
from 1 April 1999 onwards (Holtkamp et al., 2006). Like the signature requirement, the quorum require-
ment depends on the size of the municipality (Tables 5 summarizes the size dependent signature and
quorum requirements).
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budgets. This limited autonomy on the revenue side is typical for the German model
of cooperative federalism with its tradition of both extensive revenue sharing and far-
reaching equalization of differences in the jurisdictions’ financial capacities.
4 Data and preliminary analysis
Our sample covers all Bavarian municipalities for the period between 1978 and 2011. The
main fiscal variables of interest are total annual per capita expenditure and revenue in
real terms.
Control variables include: demographic statistics, such as total population and share
of working age population; and political variables, such as a dummy indicating years
with a municipal election and share of different parties’ seats at local councils.6 Table 2
provides a complete summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis. Additionally,
the last two columns of Table 5 present the variation in expenditures and the distribution
of towns by population categories classified according to the thresholds in signature and
quorum requirements.
Regarding data on direct democracy, this is the first study to exploit not the variation
in direct democratic legislation as done before for US states or Swiss cantons but the
actual usage of direct democratic tools. For this reason we employ a dataset on referenda
collected by Universities of Wuppertal and Marburg in association with the NGO ’Mehr
Demokratie’ which promoted the establishment of municipal referenda in Bavaria and
reports detailed data on all initiatives and referenda which took place in Bavaria since the
1995 reform. In particular, among others we have information on the date, location, topic,
type, and result of these referenda. Overall there were 2437 initiatives, which resulted
in 1303 referenda with exactly half of them being approved by a majority. The largest
city and the capital of the State of Bavaria, Munich, had a total of 31 initiatives with
an average rate of 2.6 initiatives per year during 1995-1999, when the direct democratic
6The fiscal data as well as the control variables are publicly available from the Bavarian statistical
office.
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legislation was the most liberal, and dropping to 1.5 initiatives per year after the quorum
requirements where introduced in 1999. The initiatives covered a wide range of topics with
more than 80% of them constituting the following general areas with decreasing order of
frequency: economic projects, transportation projects, public infrastructure, social and
educational institutions, town planning. The direct democracy variables are summarized
in the first three rows of Table 2.
Having defined the data we are now interested to see how the occurrence of these
referenda affect local fiscal outcomes. As a first step, we estimate the following empirical
model:
yit = α +Rit + Cit + µi + ηt + it, (1)
where y is the fiscal variable of interest, R is a dummy variable indicating whether an
initiative - alternatively: referendum (an initiative that gathered enough signatures and
was implemented as a referendum) - has taken place in that year-town, C is a set of
controls , it correspond to municipalities and years accordingly, µ and η are town and
year fixed effects, and  is the error term.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results for Equation 1 as the dependent variables having
logarithms of annual real per capita expenditure and revenue respectively. In the first
two columns of both tables we look at the simultaneous relation between fiscal variables
and the two alternative definitions of direct democracy, while each subsequent set of two
columns takes one additional backward lag of the direct democracy dummies.
Estimates from the first two columns of Tables 3 and 4 suggest that there is a negative
correlation between the fiscal indicators of interest and the intensity of direct democratic
activity regardless of their outcome. However, it is odd to expect an immediate effect of
direct democracy on local fiscal policy, since the budgets are planned well in advance. In
columns 3 to 8 of Tables 3 and 4 the independent variables of interest, the occurrence of
initiatives and referenda, are lagged backwards up to the third year. We observe that in
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the first year following an initiative or referenda the sign is reversed to positive (columns:
3-4), but without significance at conventional levels. In the second and third years follow-
ing an initiative or referenda, the tables point to a significantly positive relation between
the intensity of direct democracy on one side and both expenditures and revenues on the
other. As expected, the size of the coefficient is larger for the referenda dummy consti-
tuting an increase of around 2-3% of annual expenditure and revenue on average (this is
of considerable size, because as discussed earlier local government have true autonomy
over around half of their budgets).
These first step results suggest neither a robust relation nor a causal interpretation
between the instances of referenda, that is direct democracy in action, and local govern-
ment expenditure and revenue. The reasons are the well-known endogeneity concerns
for this selection on observables approach, for which this first approach is naive (Angrist
and Pischke, 2010). First, the estimates might be subject to reverse causality. That is,
citizens might respond to changes in government economic policies by using the means
that direct democracy offers them. In fact this could explain the reversing sign of the di-
rect democracy indicators over time: first citizens react to low spending levels with more
initiatives and referenda, which increase the government budget of the following years.
Unobserved heterogeneity is another well-known issue here. Voter preferences, such as
left ideology, are a good candidate.
5 Identification
The previous regressions might suffer from endogeneity problems. Therefore, we study
in this section the effect of direct democracy on fiscal outcomes with a novel identifi-
cation strategy which is increasingly being applied in fiscal federalism applications (see
introduction). Since the signature and quorum requirements decrease discontinuously
at the population thresholds indicated in Table 5, the extent to which local politicians
are constrained by direct democratic institutions increases discontinuously at the these
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thresholds. Initializing direct legislation is harder in municipalities with population just
below e. g. the 50,000 inhabitants threshold compared to municipalities just above the
50,000 threshold since significantly more (17% more) signatures have to be collected.
Similarly, quorum requirements for the approval of referenda are (33%) higher below the
same 50,000 threshold making direct democratic institutions even more liberal just above
the population cutoffs.
The fact that direct democratic institutions change discontinuously at the thresholds
implies that the causal effect of direct democracy can be established by means of a
regression discontinuity design (Thistlewaite and Campbell, 1960; Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). The idea underlying this identification strategy is that there is some degree of
randomness in whether municipalities have population sizes just above or just below a
given threshold. Allocation of the treatment – more liberal direct democratic institutions
– to municipalities should therefore be essentially random in close neighborhoods of a
given threshold. This local randomization implies that municipalities with population
sizes just above the threshold will have more liberal direct democratic institutions than
those below even though both groups of municipalities should otherwise be on average
identical.
A RDD can be implemented either non-parametrically or parametrically. The non-
parametric approach relies on a comparison of municipalities with population sizes very
close to the left and right of a respective threshold. However, as the number of observa-
tions close to a given threshold is limited, it is also customary to implement a parametric
version of the RDD. The non-parametric RDD can be understood as a special case of the
parametric RDD using data around very small windows of the thresholds. A general RDD
model linking direct democratic legislation to fiscal outcomes can hence be formulated
as:
yit = α +Dit + f(np) +Dit ∗ g(np) + ηt + it if |np| < wb, (2)
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where in our application y is the fiscal variable of interest, D is a dummy variable that
is 1 if (normalized) municipal population size is above a given threshold, f(np) and g(np)
are polynomials of (normalized) municipal population size, and wb is the bandwidth of the
window. Following Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010), we analyze all thresholds simultane-
ously by centering the data around a single 0 threshold and hence normalize municipal
population size accordingly.7 Note that, when calculating the treatment dummy, the
population numbers are taken from the previous year of the last election, since by Bavar-
ian law population figures to be adopted in legal affairs of municipalities are those at six
months prior to the last municipal elections.
The idea underlying this specification is that a flexible polynomial of normalized popu-
lation size controls for all continuous effects of municipal population on fiscal policy, while
the normalized threshold dummy captures the effect of the discontinuous decrease in the
signature and quorum requirements. Note that the slope of the polynomials of population
size is allowed to differ to the left and right of the thresholds. That is, population size
is allowed to affect the relevant fiscal variable differently on either side of the threshold
(i.e. f(np) unequal g(np)).
One important assumption underlying the specification in Equation 2 is that condi-
tional on the polynomials of normalized population size, municipalities are identical in
all respect except for the signature and quorum requirements. The assumption that a
parametric function of population size can control for all municipal characteristics be-
comes ever more questionable as municipalities with population sizes farther away from
the thresholds are included. On the other hand, using only observations close to the
threshold results in significant sampling variability. Thus, choosing windows involves a
trade-off between reducing bias and increasing efficiency. Limiting the sample to observa-
7More formally, the RDD dummy is defined as:
Dit =
{
1, if ln(Nit/Nd) > 0
0, if ln(Nit/Nd) ≤ 0
where Nit is the population size and Nd are the population thresholds specified by columns 2 (for signature
requirements) and 3 (for quorum requirements) of Table 5, which define the normalized population:
np = ln(Nit/Nd).
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tions very close to the thresholds reduces bias as “treatment” and “control” municipalities
are identical in expectation. However, as the window sizes and hence the number of ob-
servations increases the estimates become susceptible to outliers and other sources of
sampling variability.
Equation 2 is therefore estimated along different windows w of normalized population
size (for summary statistics on the bandwidths see the bottom six rows of Table 2). 8
Several additional assumptions must hold for the RDD as specified in Equation 2 to
produce valid estimates. First, only the direct democratic institutions should change at
the thresholds. Second, population size must be exogenous and manipulation reliably
excludable. The first assumption is definitely violated in our institutional context. Egger
and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010) write that the size of the local council changes discontinuously
at some of the same thresholds and find that it positively affects government spending.
In a critique to Egger and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2010), Ade and Freier (2011) show that in
addition to council size, there exist a number of additional institutions that change at
these thresholds. In terms of budgetary rules, towns that have populations exceeding
30,000 and 50,000 may apply for the status of a larger city (“Große Kreisstadt”) and
county free city (“Kreisfreie Stadt”) accordingly, which may imply additional, although
limited, expenditure tasks and revenue sources. Second, the wages of elected civil servants
change at some of the same thresholds as well. Finally, population thresholds are also
relevant for the horizontal fiscal equalization system, which allocates discontinuously more
benefits to towns that are larger than 50,000 in size.9
8Six different bandwidth sizes are defined as:
wb =

1%, if −0.01 < ln(Nit/Nd) < +0.01
2%, if −0.02 < ln(Nit/Nd) < +0.02
5%, if −0.05 < ln(Nit/Nd) < +0.05
10%, if −0.1 < ln(Nit/Nd) < +0.1
15%, if −0.15 < ln(Nit/Nd) < +0.15
30%, if −0.3 < ln(Nit/Nd) < +0.3
9There are a few additional size-dependent rules of more minor importance or that apply to towns
smaller than 10,000, which will not affect our results. For a detailed discussion see Ade and Freier (2011).
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Therefore, a simple RDD as specified in Equation 2 is unlikely to reveal the isolated
causal effect of direct democracy but rather a confounded impact of several of the above
factors varying with population size.
We address this problem by using the fact that direct democracy was only introduced in
1995 in Bavaria whereas the above-mentioned population thresholds existed long before
and remained constant in the period under consideration. There is hence a pre- and post-
treatment period. We exploit this over-time variation in direct democracy by studying
whether the effect of the thresholds on spending differs between the pre- and post-reform
periods.
Initially, we exploit the temporal dimension of our data by estimating Equation 2 in the
period before and after the introduction of direct democracy. A comparison of the esti-
mated treatment effect from these two subsamples will give a first impression of the effect
of direct democracy. This approach to identify the causal effect has the advantage of being
very simple and transparent. In a second step, however, we exploit the over-time variation
in a more formal framework by combining the RDD with a difference-in-difference analy-
sis. The idea is to explore how the effect of the discontinuity on expenditure changes once
direct democratic institutions are introduced. A formal treatment of this difference-in-
discontinuity (DiD) approach and an application using Italian municipalities is available
in Grembi et al. (2012). In our setting, the DiD model can be specified as:
yit = α +Dit ∗ Ti +Dit + Ti + f(np) +Dit ∗ g(np) + ηt + it if |np| < wb, (3)
where T is a dummy variable that equals 1 starting from the year 1995 on (the introduc-
tion of direct democracy) - alternatively: T equals 1 starting 1999 (the introduction of
quorum requirements) - and else 0. All other variables are defined as in Equation 2.
An important requirement for a valid RDD is that municipalities should not have been
able to selectively sort around the thresholds (Lee, 2008; Ade and Freier, 2011). Some
municipalities might have had the ability to precisely manipulate their population sizes
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such that they were either just below or just above a relevant threshold. For example,
municipalities governed by a right-wing mayor might have been adverse to direct democ-
racy and thus made sure to remain just below the relevant population threshold whereas
municipalities with left-wing governments might have been eager to overcome the next
higher threshold. In such cases of selective manipulation, the estimated effect of direct
democratic legislation on fiscal policy would be contaminated by the effect of ideology.
While ideology could be observed and explicitly controlled for in the parametric RDD,
there might be unobservable variables that lead to the same problems.
Manipulation is difficult but possible in principle. Population sizes are calculated by
the state statistical office, which is a state-level institution outside of the control of mu-
nicipal officials. While the statistical office relies on data provided by the municipalities
to update annual population figures, outright and persistent misreporting will evoke sus-
picion. There might be some leeway through particular municipal (dis)incentives set for
new residents to register or moving residents to unregister. Hence, the accurateness and
timeliness of population data might differ across municipalities and be biased according
to the particular municipal interests.
However serious this problem is, violation of the standard no-manipulation assumption
is less severe in our DiD than in other settings as we rely on differences in the effect of
the threshold between the pre- and post-treatment period. As long as those municipal
characteristics that allow municipalities to manipulate population sizes are time-constant,
we will be able to consistently estimate the treatment effect even if there is manipulation.
In order to explore whether there was selective manipulation during the sample period,
one simple approach is to compare the densities of municipal population sizes at the
thresholds. Spikes around the thresholds would point toward selective manipulation.
Histograms of municipal population sizes using the default bin size together with their
Kernel plots are presented in Figure 4 with 1, 2, 5, 10, 15 and 30 % bandwidths around
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the normalized threshold. Although some discontinuity is observed at particularly larger
bandwidths, the density plots do not provide strong evidence of selective sorting.10
More formal evidence can be obtained through McCrary plots (McCrary, 2008). We
provide three McCracy plots for the normalized thresholds in Figure 5 using the default
bandwidth and bin sizes. The plot in Subfigure (a) is based on the raw data. It suggests
a positive discontinuity at the threshold. At first sight, this would indicate that some
municipalities were able to selectively sort around the thresholds. However, Bavaria as
a whole witnessed during the sample period a continuous increase in population size.
It is possible that because of the state-wide increase in population, more municipalities
have crossed the relevant thresholds from below than from above. While this should
not matter for very close bandwidths around the normalized threshold, not accounting
for state-level trends might lead to wrong conclusions once observations that are farther
away from the threshold are used. Therefore, we present in Subfigure (b) a McCrary plot
based on time-demeaned data, i. e. where the population figures have been demeaned for
year dummies. In this subfigure, there is no strong evidence for a discontinuity.
Another response to concerns regarding selective sorting is that we ultimately rely on
DiD regressions for identification, i. e. a comparison of the effects of the threshold prior
and after the direct democracy treatment. As argued above, therefore, our identifica-
tion strategy based on population thresholds should be valid even if there is selective
sorting as long as the factors that allow municipalities to sort around the thresholds are
time-constant. To validate that any such factors, if they exist, are likely time-constant,
we report in Subfigure (c) of Figure 5 a McCrary plot with data that is demeaned for
municipality fixed effects. There is no strong evidence for a discontinuity in this subfigure.
10Ade and Freier (2011) perform similiar tests, however their inference is based only on the 15%
bandwidth.
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6 Results
6.1 Graphical evidence
We begin with the graphical evaluation of the treatment effect of direct democracy. Figure
6 presents a local polynomial smooth of logarithmized per capita expenditure and revenue
at the normalized threshold. We present results for the whole sample (1978-2011), and
additionally for a restricted pre-reform (1978-1994) and post-reform sample (1995-2011).
To account for outliers, the plots are constructed based on bin averages. We use a bin
width of 0.01 for normalized population size and average the logarithmized expenditures
and revenues per capita accordingly.11 Since population size is normalized, the treatment
sets in at 0 in the plots.12
The evidence for the full sample, reported in Subfigures (a) and (b) of Figure 6, suggests
that there is a positive discontinuity at the population thresholds, that is municipalities
to the right of the threshold spend more and have higher revenues than those to the left.
However, as mentioned previously the thresholds relevant for direct democratic legislation
are important for council size as well (and as discussed below for a number of additional
factors). It is difficult to tell whether the discontinuity in expenditures and revenues is
due to the improved ability to initiate direct democratic legislation or due to council size
or other factors. But since there is a pre- and a post-treatment period, we can split the
sample and explore the magnitude of the discontinuity in the two periods in order to
establish the effect of direct legislation. Subfigures (c) and (d) report the discontinuity
plots for the pre-treatment period. In the pre-1995 period, there is no evidence for a
positive discontinuity. In fact, there is even a negative discontinuity, albeit a very small
one. However, in the plots for the post-treatment period, reported in Subfigures (e) and
(f), there is a positive discontinuity that is of the same magnitude as in the full sample.
The subfigures based on the split sample suggests that the positive discontinuity found for
11Plots with other bin widths are very similar.
12We restrict the plots to a bandwidth of 0.4 to the left and right of the normalized threshold. Since
there are very few observations far away from the threshold, individual observations have a very strong
effect on the scaling of the plot if a larger bandwidth is used.
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the full sample was indeed due to direct democratic legislation rather than other factors.
In the next section, we explore whether this conclusion can be validated by a more formal
RDD analysis.
6.2 Regression discontinuity results
Tables 6 and 7 present the results from estimating Equation 2 on local expenditure and
revenue respectively, with the bandwidth size varying from 1 to 30% (columns) and up
to the fourth polynomial (rows). The upper panels A present results with a sample that
covers both pre- and post-reform periods and thus lasts from 1978-2011. The estimates
are significant while the sign of the coefficient is positive for both of the fiscal indicators.
Next, as in the case of the graphical analysis, we split the sample into pre- and a post-
reform periods. When we restrict the estimations to the pre-reform era, we should expect
no effect at the threshold as there was no direct democratic legislation in this period.
However, as discussed above there are institutional factors other than direct democracy
that change at the same thresholds as the features of direct legislation but which were
in place before direct democracy was introduced. These other treatments are reflected
in our analysis by unstable results in the pre-reform sample (Panels B of Tables 6 and
7). For small bandwidths we observe negative and significant discontinuities, as it was
the case in the graphical analysis above. These effects turn out to be insignificant with
increasing bandwidth size and reverse to positive results for the larger bandwidths.
The results become stable when we restrict the sample to the post-reform period (Panels
C of Tables 6 and 7). In both expenditure and revenue equations we observe a significantly
positive effect of the treatment dummy robust to all bandwidths and polynomials.
As argued above, with the existence of other discontinuities, a pure RDD, albeit its
strong results, may become unreliable for identification. Thus, in the next section we aim
at separating the effect of direct democratic institutions from this unnecessary noise in a
more formal way.
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6.3 Difference-in-discontinuity results
Next we present the results obtained by the DiD estimator. Tables 8 and 9 present
the results from estimating Equation 3 for the 1995 direct democracy reform as the
dependent variable taking, respectively, per capita expenditure and revenue as before.
Unlike the RDD case above, here we are able to estimate the total effect of the variation
in signature and quorum requirements of initiating referenda net of the other effects,
such as the council size or the fiscal equalization. This is possible because although the
other discontinuities vary at some of the same thresholds as the signature and quorum
requirements, they are constant over time, thus by differencing the pre- and post-reform
periods we can control for these effects.
The results indicate a significant and robust impact of direct democracy on public
spending amounting to an average increase of roughly 150 Euros in annual per capita
municipal expenditure (or around 10% of a median town, Table 8). A very similar pattern
emerges for government revenue (Table 9).
6.4 Further robustness checks
Another way to address the concerns regarding the validity of the RDD assumptions is
to look at the effects of each of the thresholds separately. One issue is the question of
selective sorting around the thresholds. As discussed above, local politicians can benefit
from increased size through, for example, higher wages or bigger budgetary provisions.
On the other hand and unlike say the program evaluation literature where scores are
relatively easy to manipulate, our identification is based on more or less precise population
count. Nevertheless, the population histograms in Figure 4 do not show a perfectly
equal distribution around the thresholds. The second concern is the presence of other
simultaneous co-treatments at some of the same thresholds.
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We believe that the DiD logic entire rules out the two latter concerns,13 but for the
more skeptical reader in this section we additionally look at the thresholds separately.
First regarding the manipulation argument, this approach is motivated by the fact that
population sorting may be stronger at some thresholds and weker in others. In case of
the second argument, the other institutions do not change at all of our thresholds. For
example, the important discontinuity in the fiscal equalization system applies to the 10,
50 and 100 thousand thresholds and not to the 20 and 30 thousand thresholds (Ade and
Freier, 2011).
Table 10 presents a replication of the previous DiD estimates at some of the population
thresholds separately, rather than pooling all thresholds together as before. We choose
the 10, 20 and 30 thousand thresholds, because for higher thresholds at least for the
5% bandwidth size the number of observations is less than a hundred. The evidence
generally proves the robustness of our findings to different thresholds and for alternative
fiscal variables.
6.5 Impact of signature and quorum requirements
Our identification strategy has benefited from exploiting the exogenous variation in di-
rect democratic institutions, which relies on the crucial assumption that higher (lower)
signature and quorum requirements reduce (increase) the intensity of direct democratic
control. But does such a phenomenon really emerge in practice?
As described above, voters in all German La¨nder have the constitutional right to peti-
tion for popular initiatives, but the degree of openness of direct democratic instruments is
exposed to a considerable variance both across -states and -municipalities. In an analysis
for German La¨nder, Eder et al. (2009) empirically show that the number of signature
requirements and the (inverse of) time granted to collect them is strongly negatively
correlated with the actual number of popular initiatives.
13An additional safeguard against the suspicion of Ade and Freier (2011) on using population thresholds
for identification is the fact that our results are robust to bandwidths as close to the threshold as 1%,
while their evidence is based only on a much larger 15% bandwidth.
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We test this proposition for Bavarian towns by running a logarithmic variant of the
RDD regression specified in Equation 2. The dependent variable yit is now a binary
variable indicating whether an initiative or alternatively a referendum (an initiative that
is implemented as referenda) has taken place in that year-town. For the former we expect
a positive sign, because citizens of towns below the (normalized) thresholds are exposed
to dis-proportionally high signature and quorum requirements, thus are less likely to
start a petition. The effect is expected to be stronger for the referendum dummy, since
this is an indicator for actually implemented referenda which have to pass the signature
requirements of the initiative process.
The results are presented in Table 11. The coefficients are positive, and significant in
some cases. One reason for not reaching the conventional confidence intervals across all
specifications is the low number of observations around the thresholds. In columns 4-6,
for example, within the 5, 10 and 15% bandwidths we observe respectively 59, 127 and
176 referenda. Nevertheless, the positive and occasionally significant coefficient presents
additional evidence on the significance of the differences in direct democratic institutions
at the population thresholds.
7 Conclusion
This paper is the first systematic study to extend the discussion on the link between
direct democratic institutions and local-level public finances to the case of German mu-
nicipalities. In the second half of 1990’s under the pressure of grass roots organizations
the German state of Bavaria has gone through a series of political reforms that have
significantly liberalized direct democratic institutions at the local level. We use the vari-
ation stemming from this legal intervention and apply a quasi-experimental design to
study the causal effects of the ease of initiating and implementing popular referenda in a
large sample of 2099 Bavarian municipalities over the period from 1978 to 2011.
26
We exploit the fact that by the Bavarian law citizens’ signatures needed to initiate
referenda, as well as the quorum requirements for referenda to be approved, vary dis-
continuously at some population thresholds. Since the sizes of the municipalities are
approximately randomized at the exogenously assigned population thresholds, we can
use a regression discontinuity design to study the effect of the variation of direct demo-
cratic legislation on otherwise identical municipal fiscal outcomes. The validity of these
estimates are cross-checked by applying a DiD approach, which measures the causal ef-
fect of the direct democratic reform through comparing the discontinuities between the
pre- and post-reform periods. Thus, we cope with RDD difficulties related to multiple
function thresholds and manipulations of population data which have recently attracted
attention (Ade and Freier, 2011).
We are able to empirically show that the size-dependent signature and quorum re-
quirements are a strong determinant for the degree of openness of direct democratic
institutions. Consequently, our results indicate that unlike most studies on Switzerland,
direct democracy had a significantly positive and robust effect on both public expendi-
tures and revenues for the given institutional setting. The combined effect of the variation
in signature and quorum requirements amounts to an average increase of around 10% in
annual per capita expenditure and revenue for a median town.
At a more theoretical level, our findings appear to be consistent with the median voter
world where the voters are fiscally less conservative than their elected representatives.
This difference between the voters’ and their representatives’ preferences is likely to be
very diverse across countries, which would be one explanation for the different results in
the studies for Switzerland and the US vs. our study.
However, voters’ preferences are not the only and not necessarily the right, explanation
to the link between direct democracy and public finances. The specific features of the
German federal setting might be the key. German federalism is often considered to have
substantive common pool disincentives. This problem also affects municipal budgets
in Bavaria in several regards. First, Bavarian municipalities depend heavily on shared
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taxes and grants received from the state of Bavaria. Second, Bavaria itself is serving as
a long-time net contributor to the horizontal fiscal equalization system among German
states. Bavarian net-payer status is subject to a constant public debate. Significant
direct democracy only exists at the lowest federal level. Bavarian citizens nowadays have
significant direct democracy rights on the local-level, but initiating referenda on a state
level remains very hard and virtually impossible on the federal level. Thus, through
exploiting their direct voice at the bottom level, Bavarian voters have an incentive to
overspend from the common pool on which other jurisdictions and governmental levels,
in their view, have superfluous access.
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Figure 1: Total number of initiatives in German states, 1956-2013
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Notes: Total number of local-level initiatives per Land starting from 1956 (the year when
two German La¨nder for the first time adopted initiative legislation) to March, 2013. The
year of first initiative (usually coincides with the year of adopting initiative legislation)
is in parentheses.
Figure 2: Total number of initiatives in Bavarian towns, 1995-2011
Legend
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17 - 31
Notes: Total number of local-level intiatives per Bavarian municipalities, starting from
1995 (the year when initiative legislation was adopted) to 2011.
Figure 3: Annual number of initiatives and referenda in Bavarian towns, 1995-2011
Notes: Annual total local-level intiatives and referenda in all Bavarian municipalities. The
initiative legislation was adopted in October 1995 as a result of a state-wide referendum
and was revised in April 1999, when additional quorum requirements were introduced.
Figure 4: Histogram of log pre-election-year population around the normalized thresh-
old with Kernel density plots
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Figure 5: McCracy plots for the normalized thresholds
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Figure 6: Local polynomial smooth of municipal expenditure (left) and revenue (right)
around the normalized threshold
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(b) Full sample: Revenue
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(c) Pre-1995: Expenditure
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(e) Post-1995: Expenditure
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(f) Post-1995: Revenue
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Table 1: Revenue structure of Bavarian municipalities in 2012
Revenue Source Amount, mln. EUR Share, %
Autonomous taxes 7,830 26.4%
Shared taxes 6,187 20.8%
Grants (state, federal) 9,758 32.9%
Fees 3,544 11.9%
Other (e.g. property income) 2,354 7.9%
Total 29,672 100.0%
Source: Own calculations based on Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨r Statistik und Datenverarbeitung (2013).
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Table 5: Signature and quorum requirements by population categories
Categories by Signature Requirement Quorum Requirement Median pc Obs.
Population Size (1995) (1999) Expenditure
% of total population % of eligible voters 2005 Euros
0 <= Pop Size < 10000 10% 20% 1494 59329
10000 <= Pop Size < 20000 9% 20% 1601 4567
20000 <= Pop Size < 30000 8% 20% 1580 841
30000 <= Pop Size < 50000 7% 20% 2035 504
50000 <= Pop Size < 100000 6% 15% 2399 315
100000 <= Pop Size < 500000 5% 10% 2486 197
500000 < Pop Size 3% 10% 3259 39
Source: Gemeindeordnung fu¨r den Freistaat Bayern (version: 24.07.2012).
Table 6: RDD: the effect of population thresholds on government expenditure
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15% +/- 30%
Panel A: 1978-2011
1st Polynomial 0.00502 0.0809*** 0.114*** 0.102*** 0.113*** 0.0462***
2nd Polynomial 0.00984 0.0989*** 0.131*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.0861***
3rd Polynomial 0.0129 0.140*** 0.144*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.0894***
4th Polynomial 0.0326 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.106***
Observations 269 588 1409 2823 4120 7795
Panel B: 1978-1994
1st Polynomial -0.180*** -0.0232 0.0480* 0.0760*** 0.0867*** 0.0297*
2nd Polynomial -0.195*** -0.028 0.0521* 0.0870*** 0.0983*** 0.0573***
3rd Polynomial -0.181** 0.0155 0.0665** 0.0913*** 0.0821*** 0.0653***
4th Polynomial -0.184** 0.0778 0.0687* 0.0838*** 0.0792*** 0.110***
Observations 123 236 615 1140 1641 2868
Panel C: 1995-2011
1st Polynomial 0.0878 0.130*** 0.162*** 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.0562***
2nd Polynomial 0.0796 0.168*** 0.204*** 0.146*** 0.149*** 0.108***
3rd Polynomial 0.112* 0.194*** 0.204*** 0.152*** 0.164*** 0.102***
4th Polynomial 0.117* 0.216*** 0.231*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.106***
Observations 146 352 794 1683 2479 4927
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent Variable is log per capita Expenditure in real terms. Reported coefficients correspond
to the Treatment Dummy equaling 0 for observations within the lower bandwidth of the population
thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth. All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 7: RDD: the effect of population thresholds on government revenue
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15% +/- 30%
Panel A: 1978-2011
1st Polynomial 0.0158 0.0783*** 0.106*** 0.0935*** 0.106*** 0.0424***
2nd Polynomial 0.0213 0.0973*** 0.124*** 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.0813***
3rd Polynomial 0.0315 0.141*** 0.139*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.0835***
4th Polynomial 0.0514 0.145*** 0.150*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.100***
Observations 269 588 1409 2823 4120 7795
Panel B: 1978-1994
1st Polynomial -0.178*** -0.0166 0.0363 0.0643*** 0.0732*** 0.0184
2nd Polynomial -0.188** -0.0208 0.041 0.0764*** 0.0855*** 0.0448**
3rd Polynomial -0.167** 0.0174 0.0590* 0.0806*** 0.0692*** 0.0526***
4th Polynomial -0.178** 0.0808 0.0541 0.0736** 0.0675*** 0.0942***
Observations 123 236 615 1140 1641 2868
Panel C: 1995-2011
1st Polynomial 0.105* 0.127*** 0.156*** 0.114*** 0.137*** 0.0575***
2nd Polynomial 0.0950* 0.165*** 0.196*** 0.140*** 0.146*** 0.108***
3rd Polynomial 0.131** 0.193*** 0.197*** 0.141*** 0.153*** 0.100***
4th Polynomial 0.134** 0.207*** 0.213*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.104***
Observations 146 352 794 1683 2479 4927
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent Variable is log per capita Revenue in real terms. Reported coefficients correspond
to the Treatment Dummy equaling 0 for observations within the lower bandwidth of the population
thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth. All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 8: Diff-in-disc: the effect of direct democracy (1995) reform on expenditure
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15% +/- 30%
Sample: 1978-2011
1st Polynomial 0.0544 0.085 0.0818** 0.0812*** 0.0244 -0.00364
2nd Polynomial 0.0188 0.0945 0.0753** 0.0787*** 0.0239 -0.00207
3rd Polynomial 0.0211 0.0708 0.0755** 0.0793*** 0.024 -0.00191
4th Polynomial -0.00911 0.0637 0.0741** 0.0796*** 0.024 -0.00255
Observations 269 588 1409 2823 4120 7795
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent Variable is log per capita Expenditure in real terms. Reported coefficients correspond
to the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy (equaling 0 for observations within the lower
bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth) and the 1995 Dummy
(equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise). All regressions include time fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 9: Diff-in-disc: the effect of direct democracy (1995) reform on revenue
Bandwidth: +/- 1% +/- 2% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15% +/- 30%
Sample: 1978-2011
1st Polynomial 0.0694 0.104* 0.0970*** 0.0941*** 0.0397** 0.00481
2nd Polynomial 0.0316 0.114* 0.0909*** 0.0920*** 0.0394** 0.00657
3rd Polynomial 0.0297 0.0883 0.0874*** 0.0915*** 0.0393** 0.00671
4th Polynomial -0.000635 0.0871 0.0875*** 0.0918*** 0.0394** 0.00617
Observations 269 588 1409 2823 4120 7795
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent Variable is log per capita Expenditure in real terms. Reported coefficients correspond
to the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy (equaling 0 for observations within the lower
bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth) and the 1995 Dummy
(equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise). All regressions include time fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 10: Robustness of DiD: the effect of direct democracy (1995) reform on fiscal
variables at different population threshold separately
Population Threshold: 10 Thousand 20 Thousand 30 Thousand
Bandwidth: +/-5% +/-10% +/-5% +/-10% +/-5% +/-10%
Panel A: Expenditure
Treatment*Dummy95 0.0642 0.125*** 0.0782 -0.0277 -0.0191 0.128***
St. Err. -0.044 -0.0327 -0.0608 -0.0373 -0.0846 -0.0479
Observations 861 1712 320 767 137 397
R-squared 0.144 0.128 0.255 0.2 0.269 0.202
Panel B: Revenue
Treatment*Dummy95 0.0902** 0.125*** 0.0726 -0.0277 -0.00021 0.128***
St. Err. -0.0425 -0.0327 -0.0598 -0.0373 -0.0801 -0.0479
Observations 861 1712 320 767 137 397
R-squared 0.148 0.128 0.25 0.2 0.3 0.202
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent Variable is the fiscal variables of interest specified for each panel. Reported coefficients
correspond to the interaction term between the the Treatment Dummy (equaling 0 for observations
within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth) and the
1995 Dummy (equaling 1 for the years 1995 and above, and 0 otherwise). All regressions include time
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Table 11: RDD- do signature and quorum requirements really matter?
Bandwidth: +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15% +/- 5% +/- 10% +/- 15%
Variable: Initiative Referendum
1st Polynomial 0.32 0.16 0.211 0.491 0.418 0.526*
2nd Polynomial 0.00835 -0.0112 0.0938 0.416 0.381 0.489
3rd Polynomial 0.0672 0.0334 0.0566 0.527 0.515 0.499
4th Polynomial 0.201 0.2 0.00531 0.715 0.702* 0.469
Observations 794 1683 2479 749 1683 2479
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy when at least one initiative (alternatively: referendum) has
happened in that year-town. Reported coefficients correspond to the Treatment Dummy equaling 0 for
observations within the lower bandwidth of the population thresholds, and 1 within the upper bandwidth.
All regressions include time fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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